Lyn May

The Standing Conference of Philosophy

University of Birmingham, 27 October 2001

The Standing Conference of Philosophy is an annual one day event organised by the National Committee for Philosophy (NCP). The NCP represents the interests of professional philosophers in higher education in the United Kingdom. Affiliation to the NCP is through departments or groups rather than on an individual basis.

Given the stringent criteria of membership to the NCP and the small numbers present (abut thirty) I thought this conference might be of limited appeal to a wider audience. I was wrong. Many of the issues raised are important to anyone with an interest in philosophy.

The first session was concerned with the question of how the value of philosophy can be conveyed to the wider community and government. There were three speakers: Jeremy Hardie, chairman of WH Smith; Anthony Gottlieb, executive editor of The Economist; and Tony McWalter, a former philosophy lecturer and now a Labour member of parliament. They were unanimous in seeing philosophy as having something to offer the wider community. However, agreement evaporated when it came to saying what, exactly, was the value of philosophy and how this could be promoted.

Gottlieb argued that the value of philosophy can be seen in two different ways. Philosophy is valuable because of the potential for practical application, such as medical or business ethics. But philosophy should also be valued for its esoteric qualities, in other words, when it lacks practical application. Gottlieb admitted holding both views, but resolved this apparent paradox by arguing that if we pursue intellectual inquiry for its own sake it often has practical applications as a consequence. Of course, this leaves open the question of whether this dual view is the right approach to take in promoting philosophy to the wider community.

McWalter saw the value of philosophy somewhat differently. He regarded philosophy as having a practical application in raising the level of debate in government committees and more generally in the House of Commons. He also identified with John Stuart Mill's belief that one of the main benefits of philosophy was for the examined life. McWalter saw the examined life as a way of improving the quality of an individual's life and "creating a society that we can all be proud of". Given these positive benefits we could wonder why there isn't a greater awareness of philosophy. McWalter argued that we live in a deeply unphilosophical society where reflection is undervalued.

Not everyone agreed with this view of society. The sales of popular philosophy books were used as evidence of a wider interest in philosophy. But whatever the actual level of interest, there is still the question of the best way to promote philosophy.

Hardie concentrated his discussion on this very issue. He took a very Humean approach, stating that philosophy conference briefing should be promoted by appealing to appetite rather than reason. To argue that philosophy provides useful transferable skills or creates a mental gymnasium is unlikely to motivate anyone. Instead, the best way to promote philosophy is to whet the appetite or create a desire to find out more. He went on to suggest that issues in artificial intelligence and the criteria used in medical research are areas of interest that lead naturally to philosophy.

Although Hardie's discussion concentrated on the logistics of marketing philosophy he also pointed to a problem. He argued that typical thought experiments, such as the brain in the vat, seemed bizarre and repellent to the general public. Gottlieb, to some extent, agreed saying that philosophers are often their own worst enemy. The quality of philosophical writing often left a lot to be desired and the views of philosophers often seem strange taken out of context. He mentioned an obituary of David Lewis where his work on possible worlds was characterised as the view that there was a world with talking donkeys! Gottlieb suggested that philosophy was in need of an image change. He compared the change in Britain's main left-wing party to 'New Labour' with the possibility of 'New Philosophy'. Whether this would be desirable I leave the reader to decide.

The response of the audience was mixed. Tom Sorell (Essex) felt that academic philosophy already addressed some of these issues, that it was interesting and had practical applications. Christopher Taylor (Oxford) questioned the purpose of promotion in the context of academic departments as the number of undergraduate applicants is generally high. However, lack of promotion often means lack of understanding and this was borne out when it was pointed out that some students are not entirely sure what they have en rolled for. Some may be relieved to know that this initial ignorance did not affect performance or results. Jonathan Rée (Middlesex) suggested the restoration of the philosophical essay as a means of reaching the wider community. He used Hazlitt and Hume as examples. Rée felt that this would probably require a new publication as The Philosophers' Magazine "with all due respect" was unsuitable.

The response of the audience indicates that some areas are in urgent need of clarification - a general desire to promote philosophy, on its own, will not work. Philosophers need to be clear about their intended audience and the purpose of their promotion. Should philosophy be promoted to have the widest possible appeal? Are philosophers prepared to 'dumb down' in order to reach the widest possible audience? And what is the purpose of this promotion? Should everyone have a basic understanding of what philosophy is (instead of thinking philosophy is psychology)? Should everyone have basic critical thinking skills? Do philosophers have a role to play in debating public policy? These options don't have to be mutually exclusive, but there may be some tension in, say, reaching the widest possible audience and seeing philosophy as a serious tool of analysis essential to public policy.

It will come as no surprise that these issues were unresolved at the conference. Unfortunately, there did not seem to be any forum or working group to discuss this further. Many people with a keen interest in philosophy do not have access to an organisational body such as the NCP. Extolling the virtues of philosophy without an organisation can be seen as just soapbox rantings and not to be taken seriously. The NCP has the potential to promote philosophy to the wider community. It would be a pity if this opportunity were missed.

After lunch attention turned to the current organisation of research funding. Jonathan Wolff of University College London opened the discussion by briefly outlining the types of funding available. Aside from PhDs and post doctoral fellowships, the Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB) supports two types of philosophical research: the extended leave scheme and the research grant. The research grant can offer up to £500,000 over five years. This basically provides the opportunity to build a team of people concentrating on one area of research. The lucky recipient can offer PhDs and post-doctoral fellowships in this area. Universities benefit from research grants, as a percentage of the money goes directly to the university rather than the department.

Wolff sees the research grant as fundamentally flawed. It is a bad use of limited resources - large sums of money are given out and yet it only supports a few researchers. He went on to add that the research grant has been created along the lines of a scientific project and yet philosophical research cannot be conducted in the same way. Trying to fit philosophy into a scientific mould stifles creativity and besides, results cannot be predicted in the same way. Another problem for the research grant is that it does not allow time off for philosophers directing the project. In fact, it creates an additional administrative burden leaving even less time for research. Wolff suggested an alternative in the form of a centre for advanced studies similar to those found at Stanford or Princeton.

In response, Fraser McBride from St Andrews discussed his university's experience of the research grant scheme. St Andrews has received £450,000, which supports two research fellows and two research students. He argued that the research project can be flexible enough to accommodate individual interests and is not unduly constrained by specific results or predictions of outcomes. An additional benefit is that it provides a good environment to stimulate ideas. McBride also addressed the problem of making time available for research. He sees the research grant as supporting future researchers rather than the established researcher directing the project. But, in the end, even he had to admit that two research fellows and two research students did not represent good value for money.

Wolff has been campaigning for some time to abolish the research grant scheme and had canvassed philosophers for their views prior to the conference. E-mail response indicated that the majority were in favour of scraping the research grant scheme. This opinion was also borne out at the end of the discussion. However, before anybody was tempted to start writing placards or manning the barricades a note of caution was sounded. The main concern was that lobbying for the abolition of the research grant should be coupled with a positive message about an alternative, otherwise there is the very real danger that the research grant would be scrapped with nothing taking its place. Any funding is better than none - right?

The final speaker was Jonathan Rée, who talked about his department's experience of recruiting MA students. Middlesex University is atypical in that it has seen a collapse of undergraduate applicants in recent years. In response, Middlesex has expanded its MA programme. The main point under discussion was the changing profile of the MA student.

Rée and his colleagues had been surprised at the number of MA students willing to fund themselves on full-time courses. Typically, self-funding students have worked for several years before returning to university. Coupled with this new financial independence has been a change in attitudes. Students enrolled on the MA program are much less likely to see themselves as having a career in philosophy. Rather, their motivation seems to be based on personal interest. They are also more assertive. Rée compared the relationship between university and student to service provider and client. However, it is worth remembering that universities have been playing the market economy game for years. The student can hardly be blamed for fulfilling their role.

The response of the audience indicated an ambivalent attitude towards self-funding MA students. On the one hand a healthy postgraduate intake and varied program help to support a thriving department. This wouldn't be possible unless some people were prepared to pay their own fees. On the other hand philosophers, until recently, had seen the MA as a step towards a career in philosophy. Students with no aspirations in this direction were described by Jo Wolff as "hobby students" and he questioned whether the government should support this. (Even if students pay their own fees a proportion is also paid by the government to the university - hence the high cost of fees for overseas students where there is no government support.)

There are, however, a couple of points that can be made in defence of the "hobby student". Even if every self-funding MA student professed a commitment to a career in philosophy the universities and colleges couldn't actually deliver. There simply aren't the vacancies. If the motivation is personal interest then this indicates a realistic attitude towards the likely outcome of an MA in philosophy. Unless of course the NCP is successful in promoting philosophy to the wider community, in which case there may be jobs for us all!