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From: Simon Harpham
Date: 27 June 2005
Comment: re: Re: Quantum reality - "There is now a strong consensus that quantum theory is telling us that one particle can somehow be "blurred" over many places at once. That is, while remaining one tiny particle it can really be spread over a very large area." J B Kennedy An interesting thought, but this isn't what I understood Quantum Mechanics' main problem to be. Heisenberg's observation that the more precisely you know a particle's velocity (speed + direction) the less precisely you know it's position (and vice versa) arises from practical constraint and confusion, not from metaphysical necessity. At the moment the only method we've got for finding out about electrons is by firing other electrons at them. We can't, for example, see electrons in the same way as one would an apple because electrons are smaller than the wavelength of light. Unfortunately a side effect of firing one electron at another is that both of them are altered by the interaction, and it subsequently becomes very difficult to say anything for definite about the electron we were trying to observe. A bit like trying to find out about hammers by repeatedly clouting one hammer with another. The upshot of these practical limitations is that when you're trying to say where an electron is at any given point in time it becomes very difficult, and the nearest electron 'map' a modern physicist can provide you with is a probability graph of where an electron's likely to be. This probabilistic approach to elementary particles (you stand an 82% chance of finding an electron here, but only a 0.09% chance if you look over there) seems to have led some people to postulate "blurred states" of electrons: the electron is neither here-nor-there, a sort of in-between electron. In addition to this practical shove in the direction of the mystical, physics has been contending with the Schrödinger's Cat though-experiment for just over 70 years now. This experiment postulates that because we don't know what state a cat in a box is in, the cat therefore exists in some indeterminate state. Personally I can't denigrate this though-experiment enough because it makes desperately hard work out of an easy situation and adds a bucketful of confusion as well. Surely it'd make more sense to say the cat's in a determinate state but we don't know what that state is, just like wondering about the inside of a post-box doesn't usually lead one to postulate possible-letters that exist half-in and half-out of reality. In other words, it's our knowledge that's indeterminate, not the cat's state, or (in this case) the electron's distribution. Unfortunately our knowledge is indeterminate (at least as far as electrons go) because our method has reached it's limits. Unless we can find out how to observe electrons without bouncing other electrons off them we aren't going to get any further, and until then all we have to go on are deductions based on interactions, none of which are independent. Enter philosophy. Exeunt physics, stage left.

From: Byron Pratt
Date: 25 June 2005
Comment: re: Total recall? - In re the comments on the film Total Recall, a whole other layer was not even mentioned--were Arnie's experiences real or induced? The film actually has a definitive answer (induced), but you have to notice one throw-away line a dialogue at the beginning. The Phillip K. Dick story, I would imagine, probably leaves things very much more up in the air.

From: Stephen Gardner
Date: 18 June 2005
Comment: re: The Hobbesian state of America - Interesting article. Clearly the 2004 US Presidential election was a showdown between the Hobbesian-Lockeans and the out and out Hobbesians. There are clear reflections of the Hobbesian approach in US foreign policy and the Hobbesian mindset can produce broadly undesirable results. The Iraq war for example has in fact resulted in an increase in terrorism and a desire by nations that feel under threat by the US (e.g. Iran) to speed up WMD capability building programmes. But I suppose for Hobbesians that just proves they were right in the first place.

From: Scott Cunningham
Date: 1st June 2005
Comment: re: Re: The Hobbesian state of America - I love to over simplify things, so here goes. Joseph Bertolini's article on "The Hobbesian state of America" is excellent, and I believe, right on the mark. Being born in America myself and living here for 36 years I see the Hobbesian-Lockean (Mostly Hobbesian) philosophy at work. The freedom and abundance of resources makes for a perfect breeding ground for GREED and SELFISHNESS. Question is, if America is so decadent why is she so powerfull? Is America the next Roman empire, being rotted out from within? Also, can someone tell me if there is a country whose people do not pursue happiness in some form or another? I've been all over Europe and I can not remember not having to spend money for goods and services. My Mother was born in Germany and came to America at 21yrs old and loves the freedom she has. I guess the American way has a way of having It's way. I wish everyone who read my sarcastic banter the best in life.

From: Phil Steele
Date: 21st May 2005
Comment: re: Bertolini's America - Where does Bertolini's condescending anti-American ideology come from? Isn't it more of the European postmodernist mentality? I refer to the response of European intellectuals to their postwar world. The Modernists had already revolted against the bourgeoisie. The postmodernists (they’ve been too diverse to get a capital letter) now had to face the reality that for the first time in over two millennia Europe was no longer the center of the world. Europe was not only physically and psychologically devastated from a second horrific war after the previous generation’s Great War, haunted by the crimes of the Holocaust, threatened by the advance of totalitarianism, menaced with the spectre of nuclear annihilation, and beset with widespread indifference to the Christian religious faith that had sustained its civilization. It was out of power, caught between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The faith of liberal democrats was shaken by fear of mass culture and the faith of Marxists by the excesses of Stalinism, but the confidence of both was undone by their diminished political stature. European intellectuals tried to level the playing field by deconstructing all ideologies, a post-modern philosophy that artists, filmmakers included, have for several decades translated into a pessimistic cultural movement. At times this ethos has leaked into American films, usually heralded by those eager to damn Hollywood’s commercialism and conventionalism, but the pessimism of postmodernism has never gripped American artists, in or out of Hollywood, with the kind of party-line adherence that was long the case in Europe.

From: T.S. Boncompte
Date: 18th May 2005
Comment: re: Sci-Phi 29: Human Evolution - Mat Iredale poses an important subject that goes far beyond the Evolutionary aspect of it, but to an escencial aspect of that wich is human. It had been thought for many decades, and even now some natural and social cientists, and actually by most people, that we are in one way or another escencially different from the rest of the known animals. I have always had this belif as either religious (god, the soul, and such) or retrograde and anachronical, so I was very surprised when I heard my sociological theory teacher say "humans are escencially different to animal in that they are racional as opposed to animal instinctiveness" I was astounded! I always had known that, being structurally 95% similar to most other mammals, no escencial difference can be meaningfull. I mean, we have the same drives, the same cognitional structures, the same somatic characteristic, so where does this rationality of us humans lie? in nothing more that the complexity of our cognitive processes, if any. I haven't found, either surfing nor in dialogue, any coherent argument about this escencial difference, therefore, I stand convinced that we are no more and no less than animals.

From: Sean Wilson
Date: 7th May 2005
Comment: re: Sci-Phi 29: Human evolution - This was a fascinating article. While I certainly agree that no population's evolution is "progressive" I am not so sure chance is the only factor that ensured our survival. Is it not possible that the reason we survived while they did not is that our intelligence, social skills, and ability to innovate better stone and bone technologies allowed us to spread into far more varied habitats so that as climate changed we were less likely to go extinct? Does a comparison of relative technologies not show this? Were we not selected by nature for our survivability rather than the winners of a lottery? I know that greater intelligence and social skills are not universally superior to other survival advantages, but given that they arise to a degree in many different animals in various habitats, is it not safe to say that they represent a repeatedly productive avenue for evolution to explore. Plus, H. sapiens are far sexier than the other humans so we had that going for us.

From: Kirk Hughey
Date: 1st May 2005
Comment: re: Sci-Phi 29 Human Evolution - An interesting article but the logical leap from the variety of human types to a reification of chance seems unwarranted. We know that nature proceeds more as an artist than a divine engineer but that doesn’t eliminate causality. Chance is too often invoked as a deus ex machina as it is to cover gaps in our knowledge. It seems likely that the most murderous human variant, our own, simply wiped out all the others-nothing very mysterious in that.

From: John M. Schuch
Date: 19th April 2005
Comment: re: Intelligent Design - I enjoyed Jeremy Stangroom's observations on Intelligent Design. Here are my thoughts. If some persons sends me a truck-load of knuts and bolts, but none of the pieces fit (the threads don't match and all the sizes are wrong), I have received a pile of junk. Science has proven that nature is not such a pile of junk. For example, chemists have worked for three centuries to formulate the periodic table of chemical elements. The "knuts and bolts" of chemistry fit. The chemical elements and the inorganic and organic hierarchies of chemical compounds are real. Certainly, there is intelligibility in nature. Aristotle likes to say that nature is "potentially intelligible." We can make sense of it because "things are what they are." They are something. A tree is an oak; a fish is a salmon, etc. If nature were junk, there would be no point in studying it. Why study junk? Because things are what they are, nature is intelligible. Nevertheless, that intelligibility need not be a design. The creationists must prove that the intelligibility in nature is the effect of an external cause, agent or designer. The question is: is the intelligibility in nature a design?

From: John M. Schuch
Date: 18th April 2005
Comment: re: Objection to Ms. Benson - Although I agree mightly with the main thrust of Ms. Benson's article, I disagree on one point. My intention here is purely philosophical, even though I shall refer to religion. Ms. Benson says that we receive no enlightenment from "above." Various religions throughout the world and for thousands of years have maintained that there is another world above ours and that certain people receive revelation. I think it would be unwise to ignore all this evidence. However, let's stay with philosophy. Socrates followed the admonition of the Oracle. Plato demonstrated the "World of Forms." Descartes was preoccupied with God. Perhaps, Spinoza is the clearest example. If we deny revelation, inspiration or enlightenment of any kind, we fly in the face of history in general and the history of philosophy in particular. There seems to be a higher level of consciousness, but it is probably not the normal object of our investigations. We do not want to a priori accept the materialist position. Philosophers consistently insist on "higher consciousness." The great personages of history do not come from nowhere. It is logical to assume that they were inspired. This does not mean that they and their followers do not do a lot of their own thinking.

From: John M. Schuch
Date: 17th April 2005
Comment: re: Consciousness by Ophelia Benson - Ms. Benson demonstrates that Sentience, Awareness and thinking are facts; that is, such intentionality is evident and need not be proved. That does not mean we know how to explain them. All proof must begin with insight. The resultant proposition becomes a premise that can then be used in a syllogism. Ms. Benson is in the room with Edmond Husserl. Congratulations, Ophelia.

From: Harry B Battle
Date: 7th April 2005
Comment: re: Provocations: God, Genes and Belief - While a 'God Gene' is an interesting adjunct to the question of whether a 'God' causes one to spirituality and by this spirituality one lives a longer life. Perhaps it is simply that those who choose to attend formal spiritual structures, Temples, Churches,Synagogues etc. may be behaving better. In other words, perhaps they do not drink or drink less because of their teaching, smoke not at all or smoke less. They may lead lives of moderation because of their beliefs and thus live longer. Lacking other empirical evidence that some other scientist has found similar results and a similar gene, LaBossiere has given us a quaint cocktail topic.

From: j dowding
Date: 1st April 2005
Comment: re: God, Genes, Belief - Michael LaBossiere makes a good case for genetics when he talks about religion,it is a fascinating idea, however, have any studies been done in this area? I am a committed Christian from a family with no known Christians in the last 100 years and certainly none (apart from myself) in my family. where does this leave genetics? Maybe there is more at work than merely our genes, environment, upbringing, life experiences etc all play a part....not to mention that rather outmoded word 'faith', alongside spirituality. Although as a preacher I have used the ideas of genetics, God does say that he wrote his name on our hearts, unfortunately for some it seems to ahve been written in invisible ink!

From: S.J. Goodman
Date: 23rd March 2005
Comment: re: Not so high and mighty - In their recent article, Nigel Rodgers and Mel Thompson suggest that we can deepen our understanding of various philosophers by studying the "bad behaviour" exhibited in their personal lives. Although I tend to agree that a biographically-informed approach to philosophy will ultimately be more rewarding than one which focuses solely on arguments, I nevertheless take exception to the examples Rodgers and Thompson cite to illustrate their point. These examples, which are meant to highlight bad behavior, largely involve finding fault with individuals for their enjoyment of unconventional sex. This aspect of the article puzzles and alarms me. Do the authors expect readers to assume that unconventional sex is bad?
Rodgers and Thompson cast aspersions on Sartre's and Simone de Beauvoir's polyamorous arrangement (de Beauvoir was "not above" sharing partners, they sneer) and express horror at Foucault's willingness to have sex with strangers. ("This from a professor of the Collège de France!") Throughout the article, they seem to draw on a number of inflammatory assumptions: that unconventional sexual practices are self-evidently wrong; that a willingness to participate in such practices indicates a lapse of rationality; and, in the example of Foucault, that having academic employment is incongruous with having sexual adventure.
I realize that these assumptions are peripheral to the article’s main point, but they are also obnoxious and merit at least some acknowledgement. They reflect a contemptuous view toward unconventional sex and embody a set of sexual norms that I would not wish to endorse. As a reader, I find it irritating that I am expected to do so.

From: Ron Bond
Date: 19th March 2005
Comment: re: Philosophers behaving badly - I would like to hear comments about the life of Wittgenstein, surely the most infuential philosopher of the 20th Cent. Other less well known philosophers in many Universities behaved "badly" and are still alive and ****king.One fromnew Essex had a child by another woman at the same time that his wife gave birth. I have witnessed severalexamples in today's universities. But why worry? The life of Iris Murdock may have been "wild" but she was important nevertheless.

From: Brenda P.
Date: 17th March 2005
Comment: re: Re God, Genes and Beliefs - In response to the following conclusions... "However, it is reasonable to consider that both the churchgoing and the longer life span are due to another factor, namely genetics." There are many other factors that might come into play with such a study. Depending on the research participants (their age and their habits), the result could also be due to the social habits and the health knowledge of the time. I am assuming the participants in this study were probably all older (since they would have to be 70-80+ years for the study to determine their age of death). For this age group, it might be safe to say that those who attended church developed better consumption habits, i.e. they might have eaten and drank more moderately, worked harder (physically), and overall lived more moderately as a result of their particular beliefs.
However, nowadays, thanks to medical and social research and the accessibility of medical services and information, many of us have developed better habits, especially as we age. We eat better, we exercise (albeit our stress levels are also higher...and stress is a huge contributor to early death - but this is just another factor to consider). It will be interesting to see the results of such a study on the Baby Boomers and the following generations. I would wager that the results would be significantly different for each generation, depending on the social, spiritual and health habits of that generation, as well as new medical knowledge.

From: Adele Tomlin
Date: 10th March 2005
Comment: re: Not so high and mighty - Re: Not so high and mighty Although I enjoyed reading this article about the pecadilloes of some of the great philosophers and would encourage people to live exciting and dangerous personal lives, unfortunately, in my experience of academic philosophy, most academics are painfully dull, conservative and conformist. Therefore, the thinkers cited in the Rodger and Thompson article are exceptions to the rule as opposed to being paradigm examples of professional philosophers. That aside, however, their article does not really address the real problem at stake, i.e. blatant hypocrisy. The adage 'Do as I say, not as I do', sadly, does seem to be applicable to some academics today. This is particularly true for philosophers writing on ethics. For example, if an academic writes earnestly on issues such as responsibility for one's moral character or emotional bias in one's dealings with other people, yet betrays these principles in their private and professional lives, it should be a real cause for concern not something to laugh about (although admittedly sometimes the hypocrisy may be so bad that is does seem utterly ridiculous). It is galling to discover that the words of an admired academic are simply that, just words as opposed to deeds. If philosophers do not try and apply their ethical thoughts to their own lives then why should they expect anyone else to take them or their work seriously?

From: David Gruber
Date: 8th March 2005
Comment: re: The Trilemma of the Trilemma - In Duncan Pritchard's excellent article on Understanding Epistemology Part 3 he discusses Agrippa's Trilemma, which outlines the three "unpalatable alternatives" that face us when we try to justify our beliefs. Pritchard says, "1) Our beliefs are unsupported; or 2) Our beliefs are supported by an infinite chain of justification...; or 3) Our beliefs are supported by a circular chain of justification." Yet, strangely, after reading this selection, I immediately wondered what would happen if we applied the Trilemma to the Trilemma.
Interestingly enough, if the Trilemma is applied to the Trilemma, then the Trilemma itself is not justified, and therefore not able to be considered knowledge (if knowledge is a belief that is both true and justified); And yet, out of this, I derived the conclusion that perhaps then there is no knowledge of the Trilemma at all; But, then again, I thought to myself that this dilemma about the Trilemma must lead us to some knowledge -- i.e., the knowledge that the Trilemma is not knowledge. However, once again, this belief that the Trilemma cannot enter into the realm of knowledge falls hopelessly into its own Trilemma, i.e. the Trilemma of the Trilemma; and so, this final Trilemma cannot be justified either. And, ironically, this goes on and on, demonstrating the ultimate truth of the Trilemma. So, my thought then is this: Perhaps, the Trilemma itself is the one of the most basic epistemic foundations that Pritchard is looking for – one of the only beliefs that can be rationally justified because there is no possible way to escape its reality. Just a Trilemmic thought.

From: Richard Clarke
Date: 4th March 2005
Comment: re: Duncan Prtichard: Understanding Epist. 3 - Duncan claims that the child in his example forms the belief that the moon is a balloon on no particular basis, then goes on to state in parenthesis a possible specific basis for this belief. Consequently, the example does not help to clarify the distinction between a justified and unjustified belief. A more fitting example for unjustified belief would be a belief that springs into being, for which there is no plausible explanation of the cognitive process behind its genesis. Of course, the theory of mind people would have a field day over this 'phantom notion' but that could wait for future articles.

From: Thomas Peteet
Date: 1st March 2005
Comment: re: Sci-Phi 28 - Neils Bohr misunderstood - Mathew Iredale poses an excellent question about a novel experiment testing age-old beliefs about quantum mechanics. However, I was puzzled by Iredale's interpretation of Niels Bohr. At one point, Iredale remarks that Bohr believed that "electrons behave like something else entirely." In fact, this interpretation of Bohr places him CLOSER to Einstein. Bohr was not concerned with the metaphysical "reality" of electrons; rather, he was concerned with the appropriate experimental configurations and LANGUAGE needed to objectively talk about electrons and quantum mechanics. For Bohr, the notion of electrons behaving as waves and particles was not wrong, but merely incoherent; empirically, electrons behave as waves or particles in mutually exclusive experimental circumstances. For this reason, Afshar's experiment poses a significant challenge to Bohr's notion of complementarity. If we can, in fact, observe photons behaving both like waves (from the interference pattern) and particles (from which-slit information) then Bohr's theory is in jeapordy. But how does this effect the canonical "Copenhagen interpretation?" While I do not claim to be a expert by any means, the Copenhagen interpretation seems to variegated and diverse to yield an answer. In addition, the Copenhagen interpretation is grounded in quantum theory, and postulates about the probability of wave functions - not on Bohr's principles of complementarity. It seems, then, that Bohr's interpretation could fall, yet still leave the funny business of quantum theory... well, as funny business.

From: Aurelien Drezet
Date: 26th February 2005
Comment: re: Re: Is the Copenhagen interpretation under threat? - The experiment made by Afshar and presented by Mathew Iredale is based on a misundertanding of the principle of Bohr. This principle tell us that if one of a pair of complementary properties of a quantum object is know for sure, then information about the second complementary is lost. This complementarity can be expressed as a kind of duality between differents representations of the reality associated with differents experimental arrangements. In the case of the experiment made by Afshar the two spots in the image plane give us a information about the distribution of particles in the aperture plane. However in counterpart the information about the fringes is very weak. Indeed, due to their particular spatial locations, the wires only tell us that there are some minimum in the fringes and nothing more. However, this is not sufficient to reconstruct completely and simultaneously the distribution of particles in the aperture plane and the interference pattern. In conclusion, as pointed out originally by Bohr, we can not used informations associated with a same photon event to reconstruct in a statiscal way (i.e. by an accumulation of such events) the two complementary distributions of photons in the aperture plane and in the interference plane.